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Abstract
We examine the interaction between commodity taxes and parallel imports in
a simple two-country model with imperfect competition. While governments
determine non-cooperatively their commodity tax rate, the volume of parallel
imports is determined endogenously by the retailing sector. We compare
the positive and normative implications of having commodity taxes based on
destination or origin principle. Origin taxes are shown to have very attractive
properties: they lead to lower levels of optimal taxes, they converge as parallel
imports increase (while destination taxes diverge), and they lead to higher
welfare levels.
JEL Classication: F12, F15, H21, H24
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the interaction between commodity taxes and parallel
imports in a two-country model of imperfect competition. The main issue
investigated is whether increased volumes of parallel imports  for many,
a synonym of market integration  lead to a tax convergence or not. The
paper shows that more parallel imports do induce a tax convergence if the
taxes are based on the origin principle and to a tax divergence if taxes are
based on the destination principle. Interestingly, origin taxes are shown to
be unambiguously welfare improving.
Parallel imports are legal and highly encouraged within the European
Union (EU).1 To achieve this, the EU has adopted a regional exhaustion
rule of intellectual property rights. This rule implies that if a EU producer
chooses to export within the EU by using local retailers, these retailers can
legally re-export the good. The European Court has repeatedly ruled in
favour of parallel imports, arguing that they intensify competition and lead
to deeper market integration.2 Recent empirical analyses of the extent of
parallel imports within the EU document the importance of these ows.3
Existence of parallel imports implies the existence of price di¤erentials
that exceed the cost of transporting these products across borders. These
price di¤erentials may exist for several reasons. A frequent reason is di¤er-
ent consumers willingness to pay across countries (whether due to tastes or
income). This typically induces imperfectly competitive rms to charge dif-
ferent prices across countries (see Malueg and Schwartz, 1994). Prices may
also di¤er, not because the markets are di¤erent but because the realization
of demands is di¤erent across markets. Ra¤ and Schmitt (2007) develop
a model where producers and consumers may benet from parallel imports
when retailers must place orders before they learn about the intensity of the
demand in their respective market. A third reason for price di¤erentials is
government policies and regulations, such as price ceilings on pharmaceuti-
cal products (see Kanavos and Costa-Font, 2005; Grossman and Lai, 2006).
1Parallel imports, also known as grey products, are genuine products imported in a
country without the authorization of the intellectual property right owner. See Maskus
(2000) for a general discussion.
2For example, see the European Commissions decision on the case of Glaxo Wellcome
et al. (O¢ cial Journal, 2001), and on JCB (O¢ cial Journal, 2002) where a 39 million
EUR penalty was imposed for attempting to stop parallel imports.
3For instance, NERA (1999) reports that for CDs, consumer electronics, auto spare
parts, cosmetics, and soft drinks, 5-20% of trade within EU are parallel imports; Ganslandt
and Maskus (2004) report that, for some pharmaceutical product brand names, the share
of parallel imports reach 50% in Sweden. Additional estimates can be found in OECD
(2002), Ahmadi and Yang (2000), and Kanavos and Costa-Font (2005).
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The present paper ts within this last category of papers, where government
policies a¤ect parallel imports, but turns its attention to commodity taxes.
Commodity taxes are important revenue-generating instruments in the
EU countries. Di¤erent tax rates may naturally lead to di¤erent consumer
prices that parallel importers seek to prot upon. In turn, parallel imports
may a¤ect the non-cooperative choice of these taxes. This simultaneous
endogeneity of parallel imports and commodity taxes makes the analysis
interesting and by no means straightforward.
Our reference point is the commodity-tax competition literature (see
Lockwood, 2001 for a survey). In this literature, it is usually assumed that
markets are fully integrated so that the law of one price applies and parallel
imports never arise. This literature then focuses on two issues: (i) whether
the imposition of tax harmonization, i.e. forcing countries to adopt the same
tax, leads to e¢ ciency gains or not, and (ii) which tax regime is best  the
destination or the origin tax regime.4
Our starting point, however, is somewhat di¤erent. We assume that mar-
kets are segmented and that all agents behave optimally. The equilibrium is
characterized by price di¤erentials that parallel importers exploit given some
transaction costs on parallel imports. The policy initiative is to reduce these
transactions costs and thus to promote market integration.5 Parallel imports
then increase, a¤ecting retail prices and the taxes set by the governments.
In turn, these new prices and taxes a¤ect parallel imports, and so on until a
new equilibrium is reached.
Within this set-up we ask a novel question: does promoting parallel im-
ports bring tax convergence? Our motive should be clear: while repeated
calls for tax harmonization in the EU have had little success, we investigate
whether a more market-orientedinitiative can bring about a tax convergence
through the back-door. Indeed, implementing market integration through
parallel imports is arguably more market-oriented, and maybe simpler, than
asking member countries to harmonize their taxes. Needless to say, such a
tax convergence is only desirable if it leads to Pareto e¢ ciency gains, an issue
that we also investigate in detail.
To analyze the interaction between commodity taxes and parallel imports,
we adopt the Maskus and Chen (2002, 2004) model of parallel imports. This
model has the advantage of providing an explicit level of parallel imports
and of explaining parallel imports as a by-product of vertical control issues
associated with retailing activities. In particular the model assumes a sin-
4While most papers in this literature focus on one issue, few papers analyse simultane-
ously the two of them, see Keen et al. (2002) and Behrens et al. (2007)..
5One could interpret the consistent rulings of the European Court as steps needed to
reduce transactions costs faced by parallel importers.
2
gle good monopolist that sells in two countries. In the home country, the
manufacturer sells directly to consumers and, in the foreign country, it sells
through a retailer. This vertical separation in the foreign country creates
a double-marginalization problem. To solve it, the manufacturer adopts a
two-part tari¤, i.e. a low wholesale price and a high xed fee. However,
faced with a low wholesale price, the foreign retailer may nd protable to
engage in parallel imports and sell part of its order to the manufacturers
home country. Thus, in trying to avoid the double-marginalization prob-
lem, the manufacturer may create a competition problem in its home market
(from monopoly to duopoly) and lower its overall prot. In equilibrium, the
two-part tari¤ strategy is set so as to balance the two opposing motives faced
by the manufacturer.
We augment this model with taxes that governments choose in a non-
cooperative way and we examine the implications of two di¤erent tax sys-
tems: destination-based taxes  where taxes are set and collected by the
authorities of the country where the good is purchased and consumed (the
current EU system)  and the case of origin-based taxes  where taxes
are set and collected by the authorities of the country where the good is
produced (a proposed EU system). Investigating the e¤ects of a reduction
of the transaction cost faced by parallel importers on the equilibrium, and
in particular on the level of commodity taxes, we show three main results.
First, the equilibrium tax rates in the two countries are more similar under
origin taxation than under destination taxation. Second, origin-based tax
rates converge as parallel trade increases, whereas destination-based taxes
diverge. Third, origin-based taxes lead to higher welfare in both countries
than destination-based taxes. Thus, market integration and parallel imports
can indeed bring both tax convergence and welfare improvements when taxes
are origin-based.
Three recent papers have looked at commodity taxation issues in seg-
mented markets. Hauer et al. (2005) use a symmetric reciprocal-dumping
trade model to examine how trade cost reductions a¤ect the choice of com-
modity tax base. They show that, while origin taxes still outperform desti-
nation taxes when trade costs are low,6 the opposite is true when they are
high. Hauer and Püger (2006) add government revenue requirements to
the same reciprocal-dumping model and re-examine the comparison between
destination and origin taxes. They show that ambiguity emerges in many of
the earlier results. Finally, Behrens et al. (2007) examine how tax (origin-
and destination-based) harmonization a¤ects rm location. They use a gen-
6The superiority of origin-based taxes has been established for the rst time by Keen
and Lahiri (1993, 1998).
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eral equilibrium model with monopolistic competition that allows for variable
mark-ups and market segmentation. A main result of their analysis is that
countries do not agree on a common tax regime  as rms agglomerate into
the large country, this country prefers origin-based taxes while the smaller
country prefers destination-based taxes. However, while their analysis intro-
duces the interesting aspect of asymmetry in the location of production, it
does not take into account the fact that commodity taxes also adjust to that
asymmetry.
Our paper keeps rm location xed as in Hauer et al. (2005) but allows
for asymmetries in the location of production as in Behrens et al. (2007).
Like Hauer et al. (2005), we look at how market integration a¤ects the
non-cooperative choice of origin and destination-based taxes, but we use a
di¤erent trade model than theirs, one where vertical links and parallel im-
ports play a key role. We perform our analysis around of what we think is a
novel research question (does market integration lead to tax convergence?)
and we show some interesting new results (converging origin taxes are al-
ways better than the diverging destination taxes). Thus, our simple model
shows no ambiguity about which tax base is best (an ambiguity that exists
in Hauer et al., 2005) and no conict between countries on the choice of a
common tax regime (a conict that exists in Behrens et al., 2007).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the
model and examines the case where taxes are set according to the destina-
tion principle. It derives the optimal taxes and whether they converge or
diverge when parallel imports increase. Section 3 analyses the case of origin
taxes. Section 4 compares the two tax regimes and investigates the welfare
consequences of having more parallel imports. Some concluding remarks are
found in section 5.
2 The model with destination-based taxes
As already mentioned, we adopt the Maskus and Chen (2002, 2004) model
of parallel imports augmented with endogenously chosen commodity taxes.7
A manufacturer sells a single product in two countries: its home country,
called A; and a foreign country, called B. At home, the manufacturer sells
qA directly to the consumers, while abroad it sells to an independent retailer.
This retailer sells qB units to the consumers in country B and, if it chooses
7Maskus and Chen (2005) generalize their model in several directions (general demand
and cost functions, alternative vertical restraints, price competition etc.) and show that
the basic mechanisms and results are preserved. Additional extentions can be found in Li
and Maskus (2006) and Ganslandt and Maskus (2007).
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to do so, m units as parallel imports to the consumers in country A.
The (inverse) demand function in country A is pA = 1  (qA+m);8 while
in country B it is pB =   qB, where pi (i = A;B) is the consumer price in
country i:We assume that the willingness to pay is equal or lower in country
B than in country A (0 <   1). For simplicity, production and retail
costs (other than the cost of buying from the manufacturer) are constant
and normalized to zero. In addition there is no trade cost associated with
authorized trade ows. However, there is an international transaction cost g
per unit of parallel imports that the retailer must pay.9 It is assumed that
parallel imports lead to Cournot competition in market A.10
In order to solve the double-marginalization problem, the manufacturer
charges a wholesale price w and a xed fee F to the retailer of country B so
as to extract the retailers prot. Let tDA (t
D
B) be the specic commodity tax
in country A (country B) based on the destination principle (tax collected
in the country of consumption). The manufacturer and the retailer prots
are then respectively
M = (pA   tDA)qA + w(qB +m) + F ; (1)
R = (pB   tDB)qB + (pA   tDA   g)m  w(qB +m)  F: (2)
The rst term of the RHS of (1) is the manufacturers revenue at home while
the second and third terms are the revenues from selling to the retailer in
country B. Similarly, the RHS of (2) captures respectively the retailers
revenue in its own market and from parallel trade, while the last two terms
represents respectively the variable and the xed retailer cost.
Since the government in each country imposes a (per unit) tax tDi (i =
A;B) based on the destination principle, welfare is dened as
WDA = CSA +
M + tDA(qA +m); (3)
WDB = CSB + t
D
BqB; (4)
where CSi represents the consumer surplus in country i, M is the man-
ufacturers prot and the last term in both relationships represents the
consumption-tax revenues collected in country i. Since the retailer in B
8We model parallel imports as perfect substitutes to the product sold directly by the
manufacturer. Allowing for some product di¤erentiation would not a¤ect the main results
of the paper.
9Thus relative to authorized trade, unauthorized trade ows are costly; these costs are
assumed to be resource costs such as re-packaging and re-labeling of the goods costs that
parallel importers typically incur in the case of pharmaceutical products.
10Since products are assumed to be homogeneous, Bertrand competition in market A
would never lead to parallel imports in equilibrium.
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earns zero prot in equilibrium, welfare in B includes only the consumer
surplus and the tax revenue.
We investigate the following three-stage game. In the rst stage, govern-
ments choose simultaneously their tax rates tDA ; t
D
B . In the second stage, the
manufacturer sets w and F . In the third and nal stage, the retailer sets qB
and m while the manufacturer sets qA.
Starting with the last stage of the game, we maximize (1) with respect to
qA; (2) with respect to qB and m, and solve for the Cournot outputs qA and
m. The results are:
qA(w; t
D
A) =
1  tDA + g + w
3
; m(w; tDA) =
1  tDA   2g   2w
3
;
(5)
qB(w; t
D
B) =
  tDB   w
2
:
To determine the wholesale price w, we move to the second stage of the
game where the manufacturer chooses w and F . In the absence of parallel
imports,11 the manufacturers optimal pricing strategy is to set the wholesale
price equal to the marginal cost of production, i.e. w = 0; and a xed fee
equal to the retailers prot. However, when parallel imports are allowed,
a low wholesale price leads to parallel imports and thus to competition in
country A. To mitigate this e¤ect, the manufacturer sets its wholesale price
higher than marginal cost. The optimal choice of w balances the double mar-
ginalization and the increased competition problems. Since the manufacturer
extracts the entire prot of the retailer, it sets F = q2B +m
2: Substituting F
and (5) into (1) and maximizing with respect to w gives
w(tDA) =
2  2tDA + 8g
13
: (6)
Substituting (6) into (5) gives us the equilibrium values of outputs for given
taxes:
qA(t
D
A) =
5(1  tDA) + 7g
13
; m(tDA) =
3(1  tDA)  14g
13
;
(7)
qB(t
D
A ; t
D
B) =
13(  tDB)  2(1  tDA)  8g
26
:
Hence, a higher tax tDA discourages total sales in A by raising the consumer
price. As a consequence, parallel imports decrease. The manufacturer is now
11That is, when exclusive territory constraints at the country level can be enforced.
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able to focus more on the double marginalization problem in country B by
reducing w. This increases sales in country B. A higher tax in country B
naturally a¤ects negatively sales in that country, but it does not a¤ect parallel
imports as they do not depend on tDB (an outcome due to the constant retail
cost assumption).
We now move to the rst stage of the game where governments choose
taxes by maximizing domestic welfare. Substituting (6)-(7) into (3)-(4) and
solving for the optimal tax choices gives the following best-reply functions:
tDA =  
1
66
(38 + 9g) (8)
tDB =
1
39

13  2 + 2tDA   8g

(9)
Hence, while taxes are strategic complements for country B, country A
has a dominant tax rate strategy. The intuition is the following: we showed
that, as tDA increases, the sales in country B rise. As a result, the manufac-
turer earns higher prots from country B (through the xed fee charged to
the retailer). The government in country B has then an incentive to raise its
tax rate so as to extract additional rents from the manufacturer. However,
country Bs tax changes do not feed back to country A as the manufacturers
wholesale price, and thus the volume of parallel imports, do not depend on
tDB .
We can now solve for the Nash equilibrium tax rates (btDA , btDB) and obtain:btDA =   166f38 + 9gg and btDB = 3   199f8 + 21gg: (10)
It is worth noting that the consumption tax in country A is always negative,
i.e. a consumption subsidy. The purpose of this subsidy is, of course, to
mitigate the monopoly distortion in country A both directly by lowering
the consumer price, and indirectly by inducing a higher volume of parallel
imports.
Proposition 1 follows:
Proposition 1 Under destination-based commodity taxes, parallel imports
take place in equilibrium if and only if g < 0:348: In this case, the equilibrium
tax btDA is always negative, while the equilibrium tax btDB is positive provided
 > 1
33
(8 + 21g). Moreover, as the international transaction cost g falls
below 0:348, the tax di¤erential (btDB   btDA) increases.
Proof: Substituting btDA into (7),m > 0 if g < 0:348. Thus, in the equilibrium
with parallel imports, taxes can take the following values:btDA 2 ( 0:575
(g=0)
; 0:623
(g=:348)
) and btDB 2 (3   0:081
(g=0)
;

3
  0:1546
(g=:348)
): (11)
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Using (10), btDB > 0 when  > 133(8 + 21g). Moreover, the tax di¤erential
unambiguously increases as g falls since d(
btDB btDA )
dg
< 0. QED
It is interesting to compare the above equilibrium with the one without
parallel imports, i.e. when g > 0:348. In this case, the manufacturer and
the government in country A have well dened objectives. The manufacturer
corrects the double marginalization problem that it faces in country B by
setting its wholesale price equal to the marginal cost of production (w = 0),12
and the government in country A focuses on the monopoly distortion by
setting btDA =  1. This leads to marginal cost pricing and thus to a consumer
price that is equal to zero. In country B, there is no production and so the
only goal of the government is to extract rents from the foreign manufacturer.
As a result, the equilibrium tax rate is btDB = =3.
Figure 1 below illustrates the behavior of the Nash tax di¤erential (btDB  btDA) as a function of g. For g > 0:348; the tax di¤erential is highest and
independent of g (and thus of parallel imports). As g falls below its critical
level, higher volumes of parallel imports have a pro-competitive e¤ect in
countryA: Anticipating the manufacturers discrete change of w at g = 0:348,
governments adjust their tax rate by reducing both the optimal subsidy in
country A (from 1 to 0:623) and the optimal tax in country B (from 
3
to

3
  0:1546). As a result, the tax di¤erential falls discretely to its lowest
level. However, further decreases in g (and thus higher volumes of parallel
imports13) reduce even more the subsidy in country A; but increase the tax
in country B (due to the tax externality described above). The combination
of these two decisions unambiguously raise the tax di¤erential.
12Note that there is a strong discontinuity at g = 0:348 concerning the wholesale price.
This is due to the fact that, even when evaluated at m = 0, the impact of a change in w
has a marginal e¤ect on m and on the manufacturers prot for a value of g arbitrarily
smaller than 0:348 but has no such e¤ect for g marginally above this value.
13By substituting (10) into (7) it is easy to show that the relation between parallel
imports and transaction costs is monotonically negative, i.e. dm=dg < 0 when g < 0:348.
8
Figure 1: Destination taxes and parallel imports
To summarize, the model predicts that, when g falls below its critical
value, an initial tax convergence takes place. However, further decreases in
g, while increasing parallel imports, introduce scal externalities that lead
to the divergence of the two countriesdestination taxes.
3 The model with origin-based taxation
Having developed in detail the case of destination taxes, we can be brief with
the origin-based taxes. Assuming that taxes are imposed and collected in the
country where production takes place,14 the prot and welfare equations are
now
M = (pA   tOA)qA + (w   tOA)(qB +m) + F ; (12)
R = pBqB + (pA   g)m  w(qB +m)  F; (13)
14We carry the analysis under the same assumption as in the rest of the literature, viz.
that taxes are based on production units. We will alter this assumption later on.
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and
WOA = CSA +
M + tOA(qA + qB +m); (14)
WOB = CSB; (15)
where tOA is the origin tax in country A. Country B has no tax revenue as it
has no production to tax.
Using the same game as in the previous section, the output and parallel
import decisions as functions of taxes, the wholesale price, and the parame-
ters of the model are
qA(w; t
O
A) =
1  2tOA + g + w
3
; m(w; tOA) =
1 + tOA   2g   2w
3
;
(16)
qB(w) =
  w
2
:
From the second stage of the game,
w(tOA) =
2 + 11tOA + 8g
13
; (17)
which, once substituted into (16), gives
qA(t
O
A) =
5(1  tOA) + 7g
13
; m(tOA) =
3(1  tOA)  14g
13
;
(18)
qB(t
O
A) =
13  2  11tOA   8g
26
:
Thus, a higher tOA decreases again sales and parallel imports in country A
but, contrary to the destination case, it increases the wholesale price w.15
This di¤erence stems from the fact that, while the retailer still decides about
m, the manufacturer now pays the origin-based (production) tax. The only
way the manufacturer is now able to reduce parallel imports is by increasing
its wholesale price, and thus by increasing the retailers cost in B.
Moving to the optimal choice of taxes, it is clear that country Bs optimal
tax is btOB = 0, as the country has no tax base and is thus unable to extract
15It is interesting to note that, despite di¤erent manufacturers objective functions, the
solutions of the second stage of the game for qA and m are the same in the two tax regimes
(see (7) and (18)). This is because the manufacturer uses two tools (w and F ) allowing
it to neutralizethe e¤ect of the tax regime (but of course not of the tax level) on the
quantity decisions.
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rents from the foreign manufacturer (we alter this assumption later on). In
country A, the welfare-maximizing tax is
btOA =   2249[51 + 61g]: (19)
Proposition 2 follows:
Proposition 2 Under origin-based commodity taxes, parallel imports take
place in equilibrium if and only if g < 0:337: The equilibrium tax btOA is always
negative, while the equilibrium tax for country B is always zero. Moreover,
as the international transaction cost g falls, country As subsidy decreases.
Consequently, the equilibrium tax di¤erential (btOB   btOA) also decreases.
Proof: Substituting (19) in (18), m > 0 if g < 0:337: Accordingly, the
welfare-maximizing tax rate in country A is negative and takes the values
btOA 2 ( 0:41
(g=0)
; 0:575
(g=:337)
): (20)
It is straightforward to see from (19) that d
btOA
dg
< 0 and thus that (btOB   btOA)
necessarily decreases when g falls. QED
The intuition should be straightforward by now: as g falls, parallel im-
ports increase,16 and thus the government in country A reduces its subsidy as
the competition induced by parallel imports helps correcting the monopoly
distortion. Given that country B has a zero tax, the tax di¤erential between
the two countries necessarily gets smaller as g falls.
In the absence of parallel imports (g > 0:337), the government in country
A mitigates the monopoly distortion by setting a production subsidy equal
to btOA =  1=3: Note that this subsidy is lower than in the destination case
(btDA =  1). The reason for this is that a production subsidy increases not only
the output the manufacturer sells in the home country, but also the output
sold to the foreign country. Thus, the government now takes into account
the terms of trade e¤ect of its policy (aimed at correcting the monopoly
distortion).
Figure 2 illustrates the tax di¤erential (btOB   btOA) as a function of g. As
the international transaction cost falls below its prohibitive value, parallel
imports increase in country A; and the country reacts by raising its opti-
mal subsidy (from 0:333 to 0:575). This initial jump of the subsidy can be
explained by the fact that the existence of parallel imports induces the man-
ufacturer to increase its wholesale price, and thus country As terms of trade,
16To prove that parallel imports increase as g falls, substitute (19) into (18) and compute
dm=dg.
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which reduces sales to country B. With the terms-of-trade e¤ect now been
taken care of, the government in country A chooses its optimal subsidy to
address the monopoly distortion by increasing its production subsidy. As
before, further decreases in g lead to lower subsidy in A since more competi-
tion brought by parallel imports reduces the need for such a subsidy. WithbtOB being always zero, the tax di¤erential (btOB   btOA) then clearly falls.
Figure 2: Origin taxes and parallel imports
To summarize, the model predicts that when g falls below a critical value,
an initial tax divergence takes place. However, further decreases in g lead to
a convergence of the two countriesorigin taxes.
Before comparing the two tax regimes in detail, we should note that,
although our tax instrument (per unit tax) is the same as the one used in the
literature, the origin tax regime boils down to a relatively trivial outcome in
our model as no production takes place in the retailer country. We therefore
briey consider the case where country B has a tax base. To do so, we
assume that the government in country B can tax the value that the retailer
is adding to that country (i.e., the retailers gross prot at rate t
0
B) while the
government in country A still imposes a consumption origin-based tax tOA.
12
Thus, while the manufacturer attempts to capture the retailers gross prot
through its two-part pricing strategy, the government in country B taxes the
retailers gross prot before it is exportedto country A. This means that
(13) and (14) become respectively:
R = (1  t0B)[pBqB + (pA   g)m  w(qB +m)]  F ; (21)
W
0
B = CSB + t
0
B[pBqB + (pA   g)m  w(qB +m)]: (22)
This modication does not a¤ect the third stage of the game. It does a¤ect,
however, the manufacturers wholesale pricing decision which now turns out
to be:
w(tOA; t
0
B) =
2 + 11tOA + 8g + t
0
B(9+ 8 + 8t
O
A   16g)
13 + 25t
0
B
:
Irrespective of its incentive about parallel imports, the manufacturer has now
an incentive to raise w in order to decrease the retailers gross prot that
is taxed by government B. Not surprisingly, in equilibrium, government B
chooses a strictly positive tax rate et0B > btOB = 0 (where tilda denotes the Nash
values when country B taxes the retailer on its gross prot). Government
A now selects an even higher subsidy rate in comparison to the case where
country B does not have a tax base, i.e. etOA < btOA. This unambiguously results
in a higher tax rate di¤erential, i.e. et0B   etOA > btOB   btOA. Although several
equilibria might exist, the most reasonable one has the same convergence
properties as illustrated in Figure 2.17 ;18
4 Origin vs. destination taxes
We now compare in detail the destination and the origin taxes and examine
the welfare implications of the two tax regimes.
Starting with the tax levels, consider the case without parallel imports
(g > 0:348). In this case, the incentives in country A are quite di¤erent
in the two tax systems. With origin taxation, the manufacturers cost of
17The existence of several equilibria is due to the fact that w(tOA; t
0
B) is a non-linear
function of t
0
B , and thus the best replies in (t
O
A; t
0
B) are non-linear as well. By most
reasonable equilibrium, we mean the one involving the smallest absolute deviation with
respect to (btOA;btOB).
18We should note here that we tried to model origin based, value added taxes as they
would be applied in the EU, viz. with an invoice-credit procedure attached to it (where
imported inputs are exempted from value-added taxation  see Ebrill et al., 2001, pp.
180). However, our model of vertical control does not provide much insights as to how
commodity taxes should be designed  the best-reply functions with respect to taxes are
3rd degree polynomials with no simple solutions.
13
selling abroad one unit of output is equal to the tax rate tOA, and thus the
manufacturer sets w = tOA to the foreign retailer. Hence, a change in t
O
A
not only a¤ects consumer surplus and production sold in country A but also
exports to country B. This induces country As government to reduce the
optimal subsidy to the manufacturer (as compared to the destination base
case where the destination tax does not inuence the marginal cost of selling
a unit abroad). As a consequence, country As destination-based subsidy
is higher than its origin-based subsidy, i.e. btDA =  1 < btOA =  1=3: For
country B, the fact that it uses the destination-based tax as a rent extraction
instrument, while it has no tax base under the origin principle, makes the
comparison obvious, i.e. btDB = =3 > btOB = 0.
A similar result can be derived when parallel imports take place under
both tax regimes (g < 0:337). In this case, As destination-based subsidy
is always higher than its origin-based subsidy, i.e. btDA < btOA: Similarly for
country B; the destination-based rent extraction tax is positive,19 while it
is zero under the origin principle. Hence, independently of whether parallel
imports take place or not, the following relation is true:
btDB > btOB > btOA > btDA :
It immediately follows that, regardless of g and , the tax rate di¤erential
is systematically lower under origin taxation than it is under destination
taxation, i.e. btOB   btOA < btDB   btDA .
Moreover, and as already shown, the tax rate di¤erential decreases with
lower values of g under origin taxation, and it increases under destination
taxation, i.e. d(
btOB btOA)
dg
> 0 and d(
btDB btDA )
dg
< 0. Proposition 3 summarizes the
above ndings.
Proposition 3 Origin tax rates are unambiguously more similar than the
corresponding destination tax rates. Moreover, as g falls and parallel imports
increase, taxes/subsidies converge under the origin principle and diverge un-
der destination principle.
The comparison of the tax levels, however, says nothing about the de-
sirability of one tax regime as compared to the other. Therefore, we now
investigate the welfare properties of the two commodity tax regimes in the
presence or not of parallel imports.
A and Bs equilibrium welfare levels can be found by using (3) and (4)
for the destination tax case, and (14) and (15) for the origin tax case once
the equilibrium values of the endogenous choices are taken into account (see
19At least as long as  > 133 (8 + 21g) (see Proposition 1).
14
Appendix for details). Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the resulting welfare levels
as a function of g when the two countries have the same willingness to pay
(or size), i.e.  = 1 (similar gures can be drawn for a < 1).
Figure 3: Welfare under destination taxes (a = 1)
15
Figure 4: Welfare under origin taxes (a = 1)
A careful look at the gures reveals some interesting results:
1. Welfare levels in both countries are highest under origin taxes. That
is, for any value of g, both countries prefer origin taxes to destination
taxes, i.e. WOi > W
D
i ; i = A;B: In other words, if the tax regime was
a choice, the two countries would choose origin taxes.20
2. Parallel imports are benecial to the manufacturing country if taxes are
origin based (i.e.,cWOA (g < :338) > cWOA (g  :338)). If taxes are destina-
tion based, the manufacturing country gains from parallel imports only
if the resource cost g is very low (i.e., cWDA (g) > cWDA (g  :348) only for
g small enough). For the retailer country, the introduction of parallel
imports is detrimental regardless of the tax regime. Thus, if the level
of transaction cost on parallel import was a choice, the retailer country
would choose g high enough to avoid parallel imports under both tax
regimes. The manufacturing country however would always choose g
so as to have parallel imports: under the origin-based tax regime, it sets
g < 0:338, and under the destination-based regime, it sets a su¢ ciently
low g.
20See Keen and Lahiri (1993, 1998) for a similar result where perfect market integration
is assumed.
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3. The introduction of parallel imports leads to a jump up of total welfare
under origin taxes. Further increases in parallel imports rst reduce
total welfare slightly and then increase it. Still, the reduction is not
as large as the initial increase so that total welfare is unambiguously
higher with parallel imports than without them. Exactly the opposite
changes occur with destination taxes, i.e. total welfare rst decreases
and then increases, but this increase is not enough to compensate for
the initial fall. Thus, total welfare is unambiguously lower with parallel
imports than without them. In other words, parallel imports improve
total welfare only when taxes are origin based.
Proposition 4 summarizes the above points:
Proposition 4 In the presence of parallel imports, both countries prefer hav-
ing an origin-based regime to a destination-based regime. However, if coun-
tries could choose whether or not to reduce the parallel imports transaction
cost, they would generally disagree irrespective of the tax regime. A suprana-
tional authority (such as the EU) would promote parallel imports, and thus
would reduce the transaction cost, if and only if taxes were origin based.
Proof: See Appendix.
The above proposition makes clear, that if the supranational authority
promoted parallel imports, the member countries would have an incentive
to adopt origin-based taxes. In that case, the sum of countrieswelfare will
increase with the retailer country incurring a loss and the producing country
incurring a gain. Clearly, some redistribution would be necessary to get strict
Pareto improvements.
Before we conclude, we should note that parallel imports under destina-
tion taxes are larger than they are under origin taxes (mD > mO).21 One
might have expected the opposite outcome given the facts that origin taxa-
tion is preferred to destination taxation, and that parallel imports promote
market integration. However, one should remember that, in the present
model, parallel imports do not have only positive e¤ects. Specically, paral-
lel imports create two sources of ine¢ ciency and one source of e¢ ciency. The
two ine¢ ciencies are the resource cost (g) incurred with each unit of parallel
import, and the double marginalization associated with the manufacturers
pricing decision. The e¢ ciency source is the pro-competitive e¤ect gener-
ated by parallel imports. Whether parallel imports are good or not is thus
a matter of the relative size of these e¤ects. In particular, like in Maskus
and Chen, we also nd a U-shaped relationship between total welfare and g
independently of whether taxes are destination- or origin-based.
21To compute mD  mO, substitute rst (10) and (19) into (7) and (18).
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5 Conclusions
Economic integration can take several forms. One of them is to encourage
parallel imports as the EU has repeatedly done over the last decades. If this
form of economic integration has been considered as important, it is because
many markets are vertically related and thus not only manufacturers take
decisions about given products, but wholesalers and retailers as well. Indeed,
there is little point to liberalize standard barriers to trade if, at the same
time, contractual arrangements, contribute to segment markets and prevent
or limit trade from taking place. Making parallel imports legal at the level of
the European Union has made this market segmentation more di¢ cult and
thus has made more e¤ective the liberalization of barriers to trade.
This paper shows that, in addition, the existence of parallel imports is not
without consequences on the choice of commodity tax regime. In particular,
we have shown that, in a world in which free trade prevails for authorized
ows of products, the encouragement of parallel imports brings about a tax
convergence between trading countries and a higher collective level of welfare
(as compared to the case without parallel imports) if commodity taxation is
origin based. This is in sharp contrast with the case of destination-based
taxes where parallel imports are shown to bring both a tax divergence and
a lower total welfare (as compared to the case without parallel imports).
Thus, by including non-cooperative taxes into a model of parallel-imports, we
have shown that origin taxation is unambiguously preferable to destination
taxation even in a set up where markets are not perfectly integrated. More
importantly, this superiority of origin taxes comes with an extra windfall:
countriestaxes rates convergence. Thus, the superiority of origin taxes does
not conict with the desire to bring tax rates closer to each other. To our
knowledge, this is a novel result to the literature.
The research agenda that we have proposed here points towards tax com-
petition models that lead to a tax convergence/harmonization as an endoge-
nous reaction to the countrieschoices. Tax harmonization as a policy that
the countries would happily implement, has not been very successful in prac-
tice. Countries naturally protect their right to choose taxes, and perhaps we
should try to nd mechanisms that give them an incentive to choose similar
taxes. Market integration through the encouragement of parallel imports is
the mechanism that we have proposed in this paper.
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6 Appendix
In the equilibrium with parallel imports, the welfare levels in the destination-
and in the origin-based regimes are respectively
cWDA (g) = 199[476899 + 311(2784g   1457) + 3 (8 + 33) + 7g];cWDB (g) = 32(3   899   733g)2;cWOA (g) = 24 + 183[40  28g + 4616 g2];cWOB (g) = 12(2 + 883   25249g)2:
It can then be checked that the following results hold:
1. cWOA (g) cWDA (g) > 0 and cWOB (g) cWDB (g) > 0 for all feasible values of
 and g consistent with parallel imports.
2. Irrespective of , sign@
cWOA
@g
< 0 for 0  g < :1822 and sign@cWOA
@g
> 0 for
:1822 < g < :338, while sign@
cWOB
@g
< 0 for 0  g  0:338.
3. sign@
cWDA
@g
< 0 for 0  g < 1
1856
(1457
3
  77) and sign@cWDA
@g
> 0 for
1
1856
(1457
3
 77) < g  0:348, while sign@cWDB
@g
< 0 for 0  g < 1
7
(11  8
3
)
and sign@
cWDB
@g
> 0 for 1
7
(11  8
3
) < g  0:348.
These conditions imply thatcWDA (g) andcWOA (g) are U-shaped with respect
to g, whilecWDB (g) andcWOB (g) are negatively sloped with respect to g (unless
 < 0:464 in which case cWDB (g) is U-shaped as well).
In the absence of parallel imports, the equilibrium levels of welfare in the
destination and in the origin cases are respectively
cWDA (m = 0) = 12 + 29 ; cWDB (m = 0) = 26 ;cWOA (m = 0) = 718   6 + (3+ 1)236 ; cWOB (m = 0) = (3+ 1)272 :
It can then be checked that:
4. cWOA (m = 0) > cWDA (m = 0) holds for  > :774 and cWOB (m = 0) >cWDB (m = 0) for all feasible values of .
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5. cWDA (g) <cWDA (m = 0) unless  is high and g is low. cWDB (g) < cWDB (m =
0) for all feasible values of .
6. cWOA (g) >cWOA (m = 0) irrespective of the value of . Similarly,cWOB (g) <cWOB (m = 0) for all feasible values of .
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